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Abstract 
 
 
A multitude of explanations for low investment by Russian firms have been offered: high inflation, 
high interest rates, falling production, falling GDP, an underdeveloped banking system, a confiscatory 
tax regime, calls for the re-nationalization of industry, excessive regulations, and an underdeveloped 
legal system, among others.  This paper’s basic premise is that investment in Russia  will not occur if 
firms are unable to ensure the security of their property and property rights; that is, if the risk of 
destruction or expropriation is high.  Nor will investment occur if access to investment funds is limited.  
Data collected from 264 Russian firms in the spring and fall 2001 are used to construct a security 
index and credit index in order to evaluate the relative importance of property protection and access 
to financing on the investment activities of manufacturing, retail, and other service sector firms in 
Moscow, Rostov, Taganrog, and Vladivostok.  For the firms participating in this survey, the reported 
percentage of profit reinvested is significantly higher among firms which responded positively to 
questions about the effectiveness of police and courts in protecting their property and property rights, 
and significantly lower among firms which made above-average payments (official and unofficial) for 
property protection.  Unofficial payments alone lower investment by 20%.   Firms with access to credit 
reported reinvesting a significantly greater share of their profits.  All other things equal, firms in Moscow, 
and firms in food processing and food distribution reinvested a significantly greater share of their profits. 
 Manufacturing firms reported reinvesting a significantly smaller share of their profits in comparison to 
retail shops or other service sector companies.  These results do not vary with the amount of collateral a 
firm has; that is, whether the firm owns or leases its premises.  
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Barriers to Investment by Russian Firms: Property Protection or Credit Constraints? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Russia began its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in January 
1992 with an outdated, if not obsolete capital stock, as well as an underdeveloped infrastructure.  It 
was generally accepted that for Russia to successfully compete in domestic or global markets: (1) 
existing enterprises would have to restructure their operations and renovate their production facilities; 
(2) new firms would have to be established to provide distribution/information/financial and other 
services which were not available in the former socialist economy; and (3) both activities would require 
substantial investment.  Nearly a decade has passed.  Russia remains one of the wealthiest countries in 
the world in terms of natural resources and the percentage of population with advanced education.  
Moreover, there appears to be no shortage of financial capital – capital flight from Russia each year has 
been estimated by the billions of dollars.
1  Yet, we observe low investment in Russia.
2  Why? 
A multitude of explanations for low investment in Russia have been offered: high inflation, high 
interest rates, falling production, falling GDP, an underdeveloped banking system, a confiscatory tax 
regime, calls for the re-nationalization of industry, excessive regulations, and an underdeveloped legal 
                                                 
1 Estimates by Russia’s national police agency, the MVD, put the amount of money illegally leaving Russia each year 
at $9 billion, with total capital flight running more than $15 billion per year during the 1990s  (See report in Transition, 
August 1999 p. 11).  Between December 1991 and December 1998, Hedlund (1999) estimates that capital flight from 
Russia totaled $350 billion. See Stefan Hedlund, “Russia’s Oligarchs Stole the State Machinery,” Transition vol 10, 
no 4  (Washington DC: World Bank and William Davidson Institute), August, pp. 17-19.   More recently, analysts at 
Moscow’s Alfa Bank estimate that capital flight in 2001at will reach $28 billion, stating that “capital flight is unlikely 
to decline over the next few years” (p. 18).  See Natalia Orlova and Andrei Roudenko, “Cross-Subsidization: 
Roadblock to Reform,” (Moscow: Alfa Bank, 29 June 2001), pp. 1-19. 
2 Goskomstat (2000) reports that investment fell steadily throughout most of the 1990s: from 46% of the 1990 level in 
1992 to 18% of the 1990 level in 1997, before exhibiting a slight increase (1%) in 1999. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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system, among others (EBRD 1995 1999).  Using the foundation established by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), Frye and Shleifer (1997), Johnson et al (1999a), Johnson et al (1999b), Gaviria 
(2000), Hellman and Schankerman (2000), and Pissarides et al (2000), this paper investigates two 
barriers to investment by Russian firms: property protection and credit constraints.  The paper’s basic 
premise is that investment by Russian firms will not occur if firms are unable to ensure the security of 
their property and property rights; that is, if the risk of destruction or expropriation is high.  Nor will 
investment occur if access to investment funds is limited (no profits for reinvestment, or prohibitively high 
interest rates on bank loans, for example) or if the return associated with reinvesting is lower than the 
firm would receive by investing elsewhere.
3   
Why is it important to investigate factors contributing to low investment among Russian firms?  
Without investment to renovate and expand the existing capital stock, manufacturing firms will remain 
uncompetitive in domestic and global markets, and service sector firms, including retail shops, will be 
limited in their ability to meet domestic demand.  If investment is positively correlated to the pace of 
transforming an economy from plan to market, as conventional wisdom suggests, then low investment 
will delay the successful completion of Russia’s transition to a full-fledged market economy.  Low 
investment will impede improvements in Russia’s overall standard of living. 
Analyzing the investment activities of manufacturing firms, retail shops and other service sector 
companies permits comparison of strategic firm behavior across sectors of the Russian economy.  While 
the majority of studies of Russia’s transition focus on the performance and restructuring efforts of 
                                                 
3 In the mid- to late 1990s, investing in short term government bonds, GKOs, was the most lucrative opportunity for 
Russian firms: rates of return on GKOs exceeded every alternative investment option in Russia (Gregory and Stuart 
2000, Millar 2000).  During formal and informal discussions conducted in early summer 1998 and in the fall of 1999, 
Russian managers and banking officials alike describe ways they channeled funds into GKOs rather than use the 
cash to cover ongoing operational expenses. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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privatized manufacturing firms, the inclusion of retail shops and newly-created (de novo) firms provides 
an opportunity to investigate sectors of the economy that are more or less thriving, and thus financially 
able to undertake investment options.  Moreover, among retail shops and de novo firms, the magnitude 
of required investment is likely much less than for manufacturing firms, and, thus, more likely to occur.  It 
may be, for example, that among manufacturing firms investment is “lumpy;” that is, the minimal 
investment is larger than retained earnings can accommodate (Rajan and Zingales 1998).  Furthermore, 
in Russia’s transition economy, actual investment requirements among retail shops and de novo firms 
may be more similar than investment requirements among manufacturing firms, possibly even among 
manufacturing firms in the same industry.  When actual investment requirements are approximately the 
same across firms, patterns in investment strategies and financing are easier to discern.  Finally, retail 
shops and de novo firms, because most were established during the transition period, have been less 
likely to exhibit the Soviet legacy of secrecy,
4 where even the most mundane operating information is 
considered to be a “state secret.”  Consequently, the possibilities for getting appropriate information for 
this analysis are much greater than if the research project focused exclusively on former state-owned 
manufacturing firms.  
Does it matter whether the lack of protection is relatively more important than the lack of 
financing in contributing to the low investment level in Russia?  If the lack of property protection is a 
deciding factor in the investment decision, policies which simply inject money into the economy to 
loosen  liquidity constraints will have little real consequence for production or employment.  The data 
collected for this paper, as well as from ongoing projects on similar topics (see, for example, Frye and 
                                                 
4 For detailed discussion, see Maksim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1995), and Joseph Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse, Kremlin Kapitalism: Privatizing the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Shleifer 1997, Johnson et al 2000), will be useful in guiding policymakers regarding ways to improve 
the environment for both domestic and foreign investors.  With nearly 50% of the Russian population 
currently living in poverty conditions (Goskomstat 2000), in a country that produces and exports more 
oil than the rest of the world, it is hard to imagine that this is a cost which policymakers can continue to 
ignore.  Moreover, despite the relatively small number of participating firms, these data add to our 
understanding of the ways in which the investment environment has changed since the financial crisis of 
August 1998 and the tax legislation adopted in 2000.
5  As such, it furthers our knowledge of how 
shocks and policy choices affect the investment strategies adopted by Russian firms.  
The paper, utilizing firm-level data collected from a survey conducted in April 2001 in Moscow, 
Rostov and Taganrog, and in September 2001 in Vladivostok, is divided into four parts.  Part I 
describes the project design and research methodology.  To examine the determinants of the firm’s 
decision to reinvest its profits, the project design involved a sample selection strategy to include firms 
engaged in investment activities.  Consequently, both privatized and newly-created private (de novo) 
firms in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors were contacted for participation.  Part II 
summarizes characteristics of the 264 participating firms.  Part III presents the empirical results.  These 
data indicate that the reported percentage of profit reinvested is significantly higher among firms which 
respond positively to questions about the effectiveness of police and courts in protecting property and 
property rights, and significantly lower among firms which make above-average payments (official and 
unofficial) for property protection.  Unofficial payments alone account for a 20% reduction in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Russian Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
5 Legislation simplifying the tax codes is in its final stages of adoption.  Informal discussions with numerous 
businessmen suggest that, even now, the tax system has improved significantly, increasing their willingness to pay 
their tax obligations. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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investment.  Firms with access to credit report reinvesting a significantly greater share of their profits.  
All other things equal, firms in Moscow, and firms in food processing and food distribution reinvest a 
significantly greater share of their profits.  Manufacturing firms report reinvesting a significantly smaller 
share of their profits in comparison to retail shops or other service sector companies.   Part IV offers 
concluding remarks. 
I.  Project Design and Research Methodology 
The research project’s primary objective is to determine the relative importance of property 
protection and access to credit in the investment decisions of Russian firms, using owners/managers as 
the primary source of information.  Six hypotheses governed the project design, which in turn influenced 
the development of the survey instrument: 
n  The magnitude of re-investment by the firm is inversely related to manager’s perception of the 
risk associated with protecting the investment. 
 
n  The manager’s perception of the need to offset risk is directly related to the magnitude of 
payments made for the protection of the firm’s property, as well as to the magnitude of the 
bribes/extortion payments made by the firm to protect its property rights (the right to realize a 
financial gain from the operation of the business). 
 
n  Re-investment by the firm is directly related to manager’s perception of the effectiveness of the 
court in upholding contracts and resolving business disputes. 
 
n  Re-investment by the firm is directly related to the profitability of the firm and/or the firm’s 
access to bank credit (or loans from other firms).  
 
n  Profitability of the firm, and thus re-investment, is inversely related to the magnitude of official 
and unofficial payments that the firm is required to make (taxes and protection payments/bribes 
as a percent of sales).
6 
                                                 
6 In a catch-22 situation, protection payments enhance the security of the firm’s property and property rights, yet at 
the same time reduce the ability of the firm to finance investment expenditures using internal sources.  Without 
protection payments, investment is unlikely; with protection payments, internal financing options are reduced, 
making investment unlikely.  Moreover, as the banking system develops, expanding the firm’s external options for 
investment financing, it may likely happen that the magnitude of the firms’ protection payments simply increases.  
What is to stop this outcome?  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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n  Access to bank credit for investment purposes is directly related to the profitability and previous 
loan experience of the firm. 
 
To obtain the requisite data to test these hypotheses, owners or top-level managers were asked 
to complete a questionnaire which addressed numerous aspects of their firm’s current conditions.
7  In 
addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with owners or top-level managers in a variety of firms to 
follow up on select topics in greater detail.   
Funding constraints limited the scope of the project in two ways: first, by restricting the number 
of locations which could be included in the survey; and second, by precluding the selection of  a 
representative sample of firms.
8   Firms in Moscow, Rostov, Taganrog, and Vladivostok, locations 
selected in part to capture regional differences and in part to maintain ongoing research collaboration,
9 
were asked to participate in the project.  The objective in contacting firms to participate was to include 
as wide a variety as possible within the three main categories: retail shops, manufacturing, other (non-
retail) service sector firms, as well as to target firms which had been in operation prior to 1998. 
Project questionnaires were designed to elicit information which could be used to construct a 
                                                 
7 To capture differences in the firms’ initial conditions, as well as differences in the relative impact of the transition 
process on the firm’s current situation, three questionnaires were developed for the project: one to be administered to 
retail shops, one for manufacturing firms (former state-owned enterprises), and one for newly-created private 
businesses outside of the retail sector.  I thank Maria Petrenko and Irina Tsaturova for assistance with the translation 
and back-translation of the questionnaires, and Inna Petrova, Mikhail Morozov, and Larissa Chouripa for assistance 
with the data collection.  Anatoly Nepomnyashchy was instrumental in organizing the data collection for a pilot 
study for this project in October 1999. 
8 Funds were not available to gather information about the population of firms in each location; consequently, 
selecting a representative sample of firms for each location was not an option.  
9 Moscow’s position as Russia’s financial hub makes it worthy of study, especially in light of a “capital city effect” 
found in numerous studies that focus on the overall performance of Russian firms.  See, for example, Frye and 
Zhuravskaya (1999), Linz and Krueger (1998), and Linz (2000).  Taganrog, located approximately 100 kilometers from 
Rostov, has been identified by Soviet and Russian scholars alike as the average  Russian city (Grushin 1980, 
Rimashevskaya 1993, Chichilymov 1999); the “Peoria” of Russia.  Including Vladivostok, one the top five locations in 
Russia receiving foreign direct investment, offers a perspective on the progress of the transition from the Far East.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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security index to measure the extent to which firms perceive their property and property rights are 
protected, and a credit index to measure a firm’s access to external financing.  Regression analysis is 
used to evaluate the relative significance of property protection and access to credit on a firm’s 
investment activities.  In particular, the dependent variable is the percentage of profits that the firm 
reports reinvesting.
10  
Investment and the Security of Property and Property Rights         
The project starts from the premise that the security of property and property rights involves 
two distinct components:  protecting property from vandalism or destruction, and protecting property 
rights, that is, the right to realize financial gain from property.  Numerous studies link evaluations of 
property and property rights security to investment (Johnson et al 1999 2000, Knack and Keefer 
1995, Mauro 1995, Svensson 1998, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), demonstrating that 
investment is lower when property protection is not assured.   
The desire for property protection among Russian businessmen is highlighted in response 
patterns to questions in this survey which asked participants about the usefulness of establishing a 
Federal Property Protection Agency (Braguinsky and Yavlinsky 2000) and their willingness to pay for 
such an organization.  Of the 259 participants responding in the spring and fall of 2001, 91% said that a 
                                                 
10 Experience indicates that Russian firms are reluctant to discuss current financial conditions in any detail.  
Moreover, if this information is the focus of a survey question or informal conversation, owner/managers tend to 
misrepresent actual conditions and describe their firm as having a worse financial situation than all other indicators 
suggest.  Consequently, the question used in this analysis, for manufacturing firms, reads:  
Did your firm earn a profit last year? ___ Yes   ___ No.   
If yes, what percent of profits were re-invested into the future development of the firm? _____   
For retail shops and de novo firms, the question reads:  
Did your firm earn a profit in its first year of operations? ___ Yes   ___ No.   
If yes, what percent of profits were re-invested into the future development of the firm? ______   
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the firm’s investment strategy in the previous year, or in the first year 
of operations, signals the firm’s ongoing commitment to the development of the company. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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specially formed federal organization to protect property would be desirable to the current situation of 
relying on the local police force; 92% said they would agree to pay for such an organization.
11  Nearly 
three-quarters of these firms responded affirmatively to a question which asked if their company made 
bribe payments (vzyatki) in the past year.  At the same time, however, only 20% of those responding 
selected “crime or criminal situation” as a major obstacle to the prosperity of their firm. 
How will the security of property and property rights be measured?  A security index is 
developed which involves both a positive and negative component.  The positive component 
incorporates the manager/owner’s perspective of the effectiveness of the police and courts in protecting 
the firm’s property and property rights.  I hypothesize that owners/managers’ perception of the security 
of their firm’s property and property rights is likely to be higher if they believe the police and courts are 
effective.  Three questions in the survey instrument addressed the effectiveness of the police and courts:  
n  Do the police work effectively and conscientiously to protect the property and rights of 
businessmen? Yes = 1.  MILITSIA 
 
n  When you asked the police for assistance, were your requests, claims, problems solved 
with the help of the police? That is, were you satisfied with the results of police 
assistance?   Firms were given the choice of: (1) always satisfied; (2) mostly satisfied; (3) 
neutral; (4) mostly not satisfied; (5) never satisfied.   The first three response options were 
coded as = 1; options 4-5 were coded as =0.  SATISFY 
 
n  In your view, does the court work effectively to protect the rights and property of 
business?  Yes = 1.  COURTWEL 
 
An additive index, PROTECT1, is constructed which has a maximum value of three; the higher the 
                                                 
11 Those who opposed the idea explained that it would simply create “another mouth to feed.”  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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index value, the more secure/protected the company feels.
12  I posit a direct relationship between the 
index value and the percentage of profits which a firm reinvests. 
The negative component of the security index incorporates the managers’ perceptions of the 
need for protection, as well as the official and unofficial payments a firm makes for protection.  
Managers’ perception of a lack of security will likely coincide with expenditures on protection, which in 
Russia involves both official and unofficial payments.  The correlation between perception of security 
and payments for security is somewhat obscured, however.  The existence of protection payments 
indicates that the firm finds such payments necessary; local authorities are not sufficient to provide the 
requisite protection.  Yet, the existence of official or unofficial payments reflects the fact that the firm has 
undertaken the payment required for protection, and thus is likely to feel more secure.  Discussions with 
Russian businessmen, both formally and informally during numerous visits in previous years, plus the 
results provided by Johnson et al (1999 2000), Frye and Khuravskaya (1999), and Friedman et al 
(2000), for example, suggest that the existence of protection payments signals a lack of property and 
property rights security.  Consequently, the interpretation that protection payments signal lack of 
security is given more weight in this analysis.  That is, if firms are obliged to contact the police for 
protection, or if firms make official or unofficial protection payments, their perceived level of security is 
low, and thus I expect to find a lower percentage of profits reinvested.   
Five questions in the survey instrument address the negative component of the security index:  
                                                 
12 Johnson et al (1999) discuss the relative merits of an additive index over an either/or index.  Their data show that 
the security effects are additive.  For the either/or index to dominate the explanation of firm behavior, multiple bribe-
takers would have to coordinate their actions (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 1998).  Given the Johnson et al results and 
results from in-depth interviews with dozens of Russian managers which I conducted, I elected to utilize the additive 
formulation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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n  During the last two years, did you ask the police for assistance?
13   Yes = 1.  ASKPOLC 
 
n  Does your company employ personnel to guard the shop (business premises) or 
merchandise?  Yes = 1.  SECURITY 
 
n  Does your company hire another organization or person for security / protection 
purposes?
14  Yes = 1.  BUYSEC 
 
n  During the last year, did your company make bribe payments (vzyatki)?
15  Yes = 1
  BRIBE 
 
n  When you were called to the court as a defendant by local or other authorities, do you 
think it would have been possible to avoid the charge or avoid the court by making a 
bribe payment?   Yes = 1.   BRIBECRT 
 
The maximum value for this index, PROTECT2, is five.  The higher the index value, the smaller the 
percentage of profits a firm is likely to reinvest: (1) firms making payments for protection, and thus 
scoring high on this index, only do so because without payment their firm is at risk; (2) firms scoring high 
on this index undertake a greater the expense to protect property and this expense is typically paid out 
of profits.   
To capture the relative significance on investment of unofficial security payments, the two bribe 
questions are used to construct an extortion index, EXTORT.  It is likely that while the scope of this 
index is less, covering only bribe payments rather than the sum of all types of security payments, the 
                                                 
13 The question, as asked, does not distinguish between asking the police to investigate a theft or act of vandalism 
(ex poste) and asking the police for assistance in protecting against theft or vandalism (ex ante). While respondents 
described both types of requests, one could argue that both would be associated with a perception of a lack of 
security. 
14 The two questions about the employment of security personnel were designed to capture whether the firm’s 
security was provided in-house or by an outside contractor, but they need not be mutually exclusive. It is not clear 
from the response patterns, however, whether participants noticed the intended distinction: insider versus outsider in 
the provision of security.  Of the firms responding to the two questions, 134 (>70%) replied “yes” to both.    
15 This question assumes that bribe payments are made only when necessary; that is, to protect the property or 
property rights of the firm. Follow up questions asked the firm to indicate how often bribe payments were made in the 
past year, and to how many different organizations. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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influence of EXTORT on the firm’s investment activities will be greater than PROTECT2.  In my view, 
the cost to the Russian economy of the unofficial payments upon which most activity is based will be 
documented by the coefficient which emerges on this variable in the regression analysis. That is, the 
coefficient on EXTORT will signal the foregone investment by Russian firms each year.  It is this figure 
for which policymakers should be held accountable in calculations of the excess cost of the transition on 
the Russian people. 
Since the security index incorporates both positive and negative components, it makes no 
sense to combine them into a single measure.  In the regression analysis, PROTECT1 and PROTECT2 
are both included.  I hypothesize that the percentage of profits that a firm reinvests  will vary directly 
with PROTECT1 and inversely with PROTECT2.  Similarly, when EXTORT is included in the 
regression in place of PROTECT2, I expect a negative coefficient. 
Investment and Access to Financing 
Investment is required to start up a new business as well as to renovate or expand an existing 
business.  I assume that firms will not finance investment projects which cannot be protected.   
Both internal and external sources of financing are potentially available to Russian firms.  To 
control for differences in current financial conditions, firms were asked a number of questions about their 
general financial well-being.  Several questions were designed to address the availability of internal 
financing: 
n  Does your firm plan to do major repairs (kapital’nyi remont) this year?
16 __ yes   __ no    
If yes, how will it be financed? ___ from profits;   ___ loan from bank;   
  ___ borrow from friends, acquaintances, other businessmen; 
___ other (please specify).  RENOVATE 
                                                 
16 Firms also were asked about the percentage of their capital stock which needed replacing.  Managers reported that, 
on average, 34% of their capital needed replacing. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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n  Compared to last year, what will be the sales volume, or volume of operations of the 
company this year?   _____ higher  _____ the same   _____ lower.  VOLUME 
 
n  Compared to last year, what do you expect the financial situation of your firm to be this 
year?   _____ better   _____ the same   _____ worse.  POSITION 
 
n  What do you think is the main obstacle to the prosperity of your firm?  
_____ the firm lacks money;   ______ customers lack money;   _____ tax system;  
_____ criminal situation;   ______ other (please specify). 
 
These questions make it possible to categorize firms as “likely to invest” and “unlikely to invest.” 
 That is, if a firm responds affirmatively to undertake major capital repair, increased sales volume, 
or improved financial situation, and negatively to the firm lacks of money, and criminal situation 
then it is categorized as “likely to invest.”  Only one firm in this survey emerged as “likely to invest” 
when using the five-part criteria.
17  Internal financial conditions are only one component of the 
investment decision, however.  The availability of external financing also is likely to influence the firm’s 
investment activities. 
To construct a credit index, a series of questions were included to identify access to external 
financing.  Two questions in the survey instrument addressed the general activity of borrowing: 
n  Did the company borrow to buy products or merchandise during the last two years? Yes 
= 1.  BORROW 
 
n  In the last two years, did the company borrow to pay wages?  Yes = 1.  BOROWW 
 
Two questions were more specific about the source of external financing: 
n  In the last two years, did your company take out a loan from the bank in order to support 
or develop the business?  Yes = 1.  BANKLOAN 
 
                                                 
17 Not surprisingly, when the criteria are relaxed, more firms emerge as “likely to invest.”  For example, when using 
only the first three conditions (plans for renovation, improved sales, better financial position), twenty-three firms are 
categorized as “likely to invest;” when using the last three conditions, thirty-eight firms emerged as “likely to invest.” 
  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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n  In the last two years, did your company borrow from private individuals or other 
companies in order to support or develop the business?  Yes = 1.  LOANPVT 
 
The credit index has a maximum value of four; the higher the index value, the greater the 
access to external financing.
18  Firms that score above the mean (= 2) are viewed as more likely to 
undertake investment projects.
19  
Regression analysis will be used to evaluate the relative importance of property protection and 
access to financing on the investment activities of the participating Russian firms.  In this study, the 
dependent variable is the percentage of profits which the firm reports re-investing.  The independent 
variables include both components of the security index (PROTECT1, PROTECT2) and the credit 
index, with controls added to capture variation in investment explained by location (Moscow),
20 
industry
21, ownership (lease or own buildings),
22 average wage,
23 and size of firm (as measured by 
                                                 
18  Among the firms participating in this study, the response patterns generate a relatively low correlation between 
bank loan and loan from another business (.2331); eighteen firms report borrowing from both sources in the past two 
years. 
19 Twenty-three of the 108 firms which responded positively to external financing scored higher than two on the 
credit index.  
20 Firms in Moscow have greater access to external financing, given the fact that Moscow is the financial hub of the 
Russian Federation; thus the ability to invest may be higher in Moscow than in the provinces.  Competition is higher 
in Moscow, given the relative availability of imported goods; thus the incentive to invest may be higher in Moscow 
than in the provinces. 
21 Firms in expanding industries like food processing are likely faced with more investment opportunities than firms in 
declining industries (machine building, for example).  Firms in capital-intensive industries (machine building) are likely 
to confront greater investment expenditures / a higher magnitude of required investment / than firms in less capital-
intensive industries (clothing, food processing). 
22 The decision to own or lease the facilities may depend upon the financial condition of the firm, as well as on the 
perception of property and property rights security.  
23 Several questions addressed the financial condition of the firm, with conflicting results.  Average wage represents 
the best proxy for the firm’s financial condition.  Controlling for industry and regional differences in wage rates, firms 
reporting profits tend to be firms which pay above-average wages; the correlation coefficients range from .3568 to 
.4518, depending on the industry and region.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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number of employees).
24  In a second specification, change in financial position and change volume of 
operations (sales), both variables referring to changes over the previous year, also are included as 
controls to capture the extent to which re-investment may be driven by changes the firm’s financial 
conditions.  In a third specification, the credit index is redefined from the additive index used initially, to 
an either/or (0,1) access to external financing index (LOAN).  That is, if the firm reports any external 
financing, the value is one; otherwise the value is zero.  If the LOAN coefficient is significant and the 
explanatory power of the specification is higher, this implies that the existence of external financing rather 
than the multiple sources of external financing influences the firm’s investment activities. 
The variable list, variable means, and variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  The 
following section provides a description of the Russian firms participating in the survey.  
II.  Characteristics of the Participating Firms             
In April and September, 2001, two hundred sixty-four firms participated in a survey that 
focused on barriers to investment among Russian firms.
25  As seen in Table 1, of the participating firms, 
40 were located in Moscow, 35 in Rostov, 139 in Taganrog,
26 and 50 in Vladivostok.  Nearly half of 
the participating firms engaged in retail trade (46%); approximately one-quarter (24%) offered other 
services to businesses and consumers.  Among these, the majority (64%) of non-manufacturing firms 
were established after 1995.
27   Just under one-third (30%) of the participating firms were involved in 
                                                 
24 Larger firms are expected to have higher investment requirements than smaller firms. 
25 Altogether, some 307 firms were contacted.  Thus, the response rate was 86%. 
26 Includes 3 firms located in Azov. 
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manufacturing.   
The distribution of firms by main product type is given in Table 1. Over one-third of the 
participating firms were involved in the production or distribution of food products.  The production or 
distribution of consumer goods and other durables (including office equipment) accounted for 28% of 
the participating firms.  Manufacturers of machinery and equipment and other producer goods 
comprised 5%, with firms producing or distributing construction materials accounting for 9% of the 
participating firms.   Less than half (46%) of the participating firms owned the building(s) in which their 
company operates; in Taganrog, the smallest of the four locations, the ownership rate is significantly 
higher (70%). 
Given the composition of the sample, it is not surprising that nearly half of the firms participating 
in the survey project employ 25 or fewer workers.   Among the retail shops, however, the average 
number of employees totals 43, due to the number of companies which operate shops in several 
locations and employ, in total, over 150 workers.  The manufacturing firms participating in this survey 
report employing, on average, 373 workers. 
At least three-quarters of the participating firms report profits; in Moscow, the reported 
percentage is much higher (92.5%).  Firms in Moscow and Vladivostok report reinvesting a greater 
share of their profits than firms in Rostov and Taganrog (see Table 1).  This result holds when type of 
firm is held constant; that is, among retail shops, reinvested profits average 62% in Moscow, 86% in 
Vladivostok, 19% in Taganrog, and 14% in Rostov.  At the same time, the percentage of retail shops 
that report borrowing to cover working capital expenses accounts for nearly 78% of the Moscow firms, 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 Only these two groups of firms, retail shops and de novo firms, were asked about the year in which the company 
was established.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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30% of the participating shops in Vladivostok, and 11% of the shops in Taganrog.  
Firms participating in this survey were more likely to borrow from other companies than from 
banks: 8% of the firms in Moscow borrowed from the bank, while 80% reported borrowing from other 
firms.  Outside of Moscow, borrowing from other firms was significantly less prevalent, in general, and 
among the retail shops, in particular, borrowing from other firms was much less than their counterparts in 
Moscow. 
Wages varied dramatically by geographical location.  Among the retail shops participating in this 
project, wages were significantly higher in Moscow (5214 rubles) than in Rostov (2010 rubles), 
Taganrog (1440 rubles), or Vladivostok (4007 rubles).  Outside of Moscow, retail employees were 
paid,  on average, about the same as manufacturing employees (2014 rubles compared to 2010 rubles), 
and somewhat less than other service sector workers (2271 rubles).  Excluding Rostov, only 10% of 
the firms report borrowing money in the last two years to cover their wage bill. 
The figures reported in Table 1 refer to the entire set of participating firms.  In Moscow, all of 
the participating firms were retail shops.  Consequently, a more useful comparison focuses on similarities 
and differences among retail shops in the four regions.  For example, among Moscow shops, nearly all 
report paying bribes (97.5%); compared to 75% of the participating firms in Taganrog, 69% of the 
firms in Rostov, and 48% of the firms in Vladivostok.  When the comparison is limited to retail shops, 
the regional differences become somewhat smaller, but the difference between the provinces and 
Moscow remains significant.  That is, 70% of the retail shops in Taganrog and Rostov, and 65% of the 
retail shops in Vladivostok report making bribe payments; compared to about 98% of the retail shops in 
Moscow.  A similar pattern is found in responses to the questions about the volume of sales and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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financial position, as well as the percentage of capital and labor that needs replacement: regional 
variation diminishes when only retail shops are included in the analysis, but there remains a significant 
difference between response patterns of Moscow shops and shops in the provinces.
28   Moscow is not 
a leader in terms of changes associated with the transition process when considering the number of 
shops engaged in barter transactions (in all four regions the percentage of shops reporting barter 
transactions is about 20-25%); nor is Moscow a leader with regard to membership in professional 
associations or trade groups: in this case, a greater proportion of firms in Vladivostok respond 
affirmatively (see Table 1). 
Investment Strategies: A descriptive analysis 
The survey instrument included a number of questions related to the firm’s actual and planned 
investment activities.  For example, survey participants were asked about plans to renovate and how the 
renovation was to be financed.  Participants also were asked what percentage of the firm’s capital stock 
needs replacing.  Finally, participants were asked about the percentage of profit which the firm 
reinvests. 
As seen in Table 1, firms report that an average of 25% to 35% of their capital stock needs 
replacing; among manufacturing firms, the average exceeds 40%.
29  Firms in heavy industry report that 
between 25% and 90% of their capital stock needs replacing. 
While the potential demand for investment is high among Russian firms, plans for renovation are 
limited.  Of the 261 firms responding to the question, just over 20% report current plans to renovate 
                                                 
28 In two instances, financial position and volume of sales, Vladivostok response patterns are closer to Moscow than 
to Rostov and Taganrog. 
29 By contrast, firms report the need to replace only 5-15% of their current workforce, depending upon the region and 
sector in which the firm is located.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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their capital stock.  Of these, the majority (nearly two-thirds) intended to finance the renovations from 
profits; less than one-quarter indicated that their plans for renovation would be financed by personal 
funds; 15% indicated they would borrow, either from the bank or from other businesses, to finance the 
renovations. 
All firms were asked about the percentage of profits which they reinvest.  A total of 210 firms 
reported reinvesting a portion of their profits.   In comparison to the manufacturing firms participating in 
the survey, retail and other service sector firms report reinvesting a significantly greater percentage of 
their profits: that is, among retail shops, reinvestment averaged 43%,  compared to 19% among 
manufacturing firms.  Among the participating retail shops, reported reinvestment averaged over 86% in 
Vladivostok, 62% in Moscow, 14% in Rostov, and 19% in Taganrog.
30  
In comparison to heavy industry firms (producers and distributors), firms involved in the 
processing or distribution of food products and firms involved in services report reinvesting a 
significantly greater percentage of profits.   
The percentage of profits reinvested does not vary by firm’s reported change in financial 
position.  That is, the reported percentage of profits reinvested does not depend upon whether the firm 
says its financial position is better, the same, or worse than last year.  However, the percentage of 
profits reinvested does vary in accordance with whether or not the firm reports itself as having no money 
(lack of money is the most important obstacle to its current operations). 
Data collected from these firms are used to examine the relative importance of property 
protection and access to credit in explaining the variation in investment. 
                                                 
30 In comparison to participating firms in Taganrog, firms in Moscow (all retail) and firms in Vladivostok (retail, 
manufacturing and services) reinvest significantly more profits. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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III.  Empirical Results 
To what extent are investment expenditures influenced by the perceived level of security and/or 
access to external financing?  Table 2 summarizes the response patterns for both the security index 
(PROTECT1 and PROTECT2) and the credit index.  As seen in column 1, the 264 firms participating 
in this survey displayed a low regard for the effectiveness of the police and courts.  A score of 1.5 on 
PROTECT1 signals a neutral perception of the effectiveness of the official providers of security in the 
Russian economy.  The mean score for PROTECT1 for the firms participating in this survey is 0.40, 
significantly lower than the neutral score.  While there is variation in the mean score by region: firms in 
Vladivostok have a significantly higher regard for the police and courts than firms in Moscow, Rostov or 
Taganrog; as well as variation by type of firm: owners of retail shops have a significantly higher regard 
for the police and courts than owners of other service sector companies or managers of manufacturing 
firms, overall, perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and courts among these respondents appear 
decidedly skeptical.  
PROTECT2 is a measure of the official and unofficial security payments made by the firm.  In 
this analysis, firms scoring 2.5 are defined as having an “average” level of perceived security.  Firms 
scoring above 3.0 are defined as having a security situation that requires them to make “above average” 
payments in order to offset the risk associated with destruction or expropriation.  Firms scoring below 
2.0 are defined as having a relatively secure situation with regard to the protection of property and 
property rights.  The mean score on PROTECT2 for the firms participating in this survey is 2.96.  As 
seen in column 2, service sector firms tend to fare marginally better in terms of property protection.  
Once again, firms in Vladivostok stand out: in this instance, they pay a significantly lower price for William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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security. 
Column 3 of Table 2, EXTORT, summarizes the response patterns for the two questions 
regarding the payment of bribes.  The mean score on the extortion index for participating firms is 1.29.  
Firms in Vladivostok scored significantly lower (0.48) than the mean.  Firms in Rostov and Taganrog 
scored significantly higher.  Interestingly enough, producers and/or distributors of consumer durables 
(including electronic equipment) scored the highest on the extortion index (1.38) and scored the lowest 
in terms of their view of the effectiveness of the police and courts, PROTECT1 (.21).  The negative 
correlation holds, albeit somewhat weakly, for the entire group of participating firms; that is, the 
correlation coefficient between PROTECT1 and EXTORT is -.2585. 
The last column of Table 2 summarizes the firms’ experience with regard to external financing.  
Generally, access to external financing is low among the firms participating in this survey; the mean score 
on CREDIT is 0.78 (out of 4.0).  Firms in Moscow stand out as having the greatest access to credit 
(1.75), especially relative to comparable firms in the other regions (0.54). 
The results presented in Table 2 suggest that Russian firms do not perceive their property or 
property rights as secure.  Nor do they report much experience with external financing.  Neither 
outcome, relative lack of security and relative lack of external financing, is dependent upon whether the 
firm owns or leases the company’s premises.  That is, firms with collateral (they report owning their 
premises) are no more likely to undertake external financing than firms which lease their premises. 
What factors determine the percentage of profits that Russian firms reinvest?  Table 3 presents 
the regression results, where reinvest is the dependent variable.  In the first specification, the 
independent variables consist of the two components of the security index, PROTECT1 and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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PROTECT2, and the credit index, with a control variable for location in Moscow.  As seen in the first 
column, the percentage of profits reinvested is significantly higher among firms with a positive perception 
of the effectiveness of the police and courts (PROTECT1), and significantly lower among firms making 
protection payments (PROTECT2).  The relative impact of both the positive (8.0%) and negative (-
7.7%) components of the security index is approximately the same.  Access to external financing has a 
positive impact on the percentage of profits reinvested by the firm, albeit smaller than the impact of 
property protection.    In comparison to the relative importance of property protection or access to 
financing, location in Moscow has a much larger influence on the firm decision to reinvest profits.    
The second specification uses the extortion index to capture the firm’s perception of the security 
of property and property rights (column 2).  Among firms making bribe payments (EXTORT), the 
percentage of profits reinvested is significantly lower.  This specification has about the same explanatory 
power as the first, suggesting that the payment of bribes is a more important indicator than any 
combination of official protection payments.  Moreover, the coefficient (EXTORT) is nearly three times 
 larger than the coefficient on access to financing (CREDIT).   Location in Moscow continues to have a 
positive impact on the firm’s reinvestment allocation. 
In the third specification, dummy variables are included to capture differences in investment 
strategies across sectors of the economy.  Sectors are defined by type of product; for example, both 
food processing and food distribution firms are included in FOOD.  DURABLES includes both the 
producers and distributors of consumer durables.  Heavy industry, which includes both the producers 
and distributors of machinery and other heavy industry items, is the omitted sector in this analysis.   
PROTECT1 and PROTECT2 are used to capture the managers’ perceptions of the security position of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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their firms.  Once again, the percentage of profits reinvested is higher among firms with a positive 
perception of the effectiveness of the police and courts, and lower among firms making protection 
payments.  Access to credit has a positive impact on reinvestment, as does location in Moscow.  In 
comparison to heavy industry firms, firms in food processing and “other industry and services” reinvest a 
significantly higher fraction of their profits.  The next specification provided in Table 3 (column 4) 
substitutes the extortion index, EXTORT, for PROTECT1 and PROTECT2, and despite the reduction 
in the number of variables included in the specification, the explanatory power rises.  The basic pattern 
remains the same: (1) extortion (lack of security) reduces reinvestment by 18%; (2) access to external 
financing raises reinvesment by 5%; (3) firms in Moscow reinvest at least 20% more than firms in the 
other regions.    
Do manufacturing firms differ from retail shops and other service sector firms in terms of their 
reinvestment strategy?  As seen in column 5, the manufacturing firms in this survey reinvested a 
significantly smaller fraction of their profits. 
The final specification in this panel of Table 3 takes into account the financial position of the firm 
and the availability of collateral for loans.  The best proxy for the firm’s financial position was the 
reported level of average wages paid to employees.  The proxy for the availability of collateral is 
whether or not the firm reports owning its premises.  As seen in column 6, firms which pay above 
average wages (are in good financial condition) reinvest a significantly greater portion of their profits.  
Indeed, including this variable significantly increases the explanatory power of the equation.   That the 
coefficient on location in Moscow loses significance is explained by the high degree of correlation 
between high wages and Moscow.  The availability of collateral (LEASE) has no significant effect on the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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firm’s reinvestment behavior.   
In the second panel of Table 3, workforce size is included as an explanatory variable in the 
reinvestment decision (column 7), as are changes in the firm’s sales volume (VOLUME) and financial 
position (POSITION) over the past year (see column 8).  No new results emerge.   
In column 9, the additive credit index is replaced by a dummy variable, LOAN, which equals 
one if the firm has received any external financing.  This specification has approximately the same 
explanatory power as the first (column 1), but the coefficient on LOAN is nearly twice that on 
CREDIT, suggesting that access to financing is more important than the availability of multiple sources.   
The specification reported in column 10 is to be compared with column 2, where EXTORT 
replaces PROTECT1 and PROTECT2 as the measure of security.  In column 11, the sector variables 
are added to the specification, for comparison with column 3. 
Overall, the results emerging from these data are remarkably robust.  Firms which face a lack of 
security reinvest a significantly smaller fraction of their profits.  The effect is strongest among firms 
making bribe payments.  Firms with access to credit reinvest a significantly greater share of their profits. 
 Firms located in Moscow reinvest significantly more than firms elsewhere.  Only when average wage is 
included, which is highly correlated with Moscow, does the “capital city effect” become insignificant.  
Firms in the food processing and food distribution sector reinvest a significantly higher share of their 
profits, as do firms in “other industry and services.”  Manufacturing firms reinvest significantly less, in 
comparison to retail shops and other service sector firms.  
IV.  Conclusions 
Six hypotheses governed the development of both a security index and credit index in this William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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investigation of the factors which influence the investment activities of Russian firms.  Data collected 
from 264 Russian firms in the spring and fall of 2001 were used to evaluate the relative importance of 
property protection and access to credit on the decision by firms to reinvest their profits.  Property 
protection emerges as nearly twice as important as access to external financing in terms of explaining the 
percentage of profit that the firm reinvested.
31  These results send a clear signal that simply injecting 
money into the banking system – loosening credit constraints in the economy – will not reverse the 
decision of Russian firms to reinvest a relatively small portion of their profits back into the company.  
More important, from the perspective of the firms participating in this study, is for policymakers to 
devise a way to protect the property and property rights of Russian businesses.  The cost of not doing 
so appears to be an investment level 10% lower than it could be given the existing financial situation.  
While this percentage may seem low, in the absence of rule of law it has compounded each year for the 
past decade, imposing upon the Russian people a transition cost far higher than warranted. 
                                                 
31 The one exception occurs when security is measured by the existence of bribe payments and credit access is 
measured using a dummy variable which equals one if external financing is available.  In this specification (Table 3, 
column 12), both property protection and credit access have approximately the same effect on the percentage of 
profits reinvested. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Participating Firms 
 
  Moscow  Rostov  Taganrog+  Vladivostok
  Frequency %  Frequency %  Frequency %  Frequency % 
 
 
Number of Firms  40  15  35  13  139  53  50  19 
   
Year Established* 
before 1992  1  2.5  0  0  1  1.2  3  8.5 
1992  4  10.0  1  7.1  8  9.7  1  2.8 
1993-1995  13  32.5  4  28.6  16  19.5  8  22.8 
1996-1998  17  56.7  6  42.8  34  41.4  15  42.8 
since 1998  5  12.5  3  21.4  23  28.0  8  22.8 
Total  40  100  14  100  82  100  35  100 
 
Type of Firm 
Manufacturing  0  0  22  62.8  43  30.9  14  28.0 
Retail  40  100  10  28.6  52  37.4  20  40 
Other  0  0  3  8.6  44  31.7  16  32 
  Total  40  100  35  100  139  100  50  100 
 
Food  33  82.5  4  11.4  42  30.2  17  34.0 
Consumer goods   5  12.5  10  28.6  13  9.3  3  6.0 
Durables  2  5.0  9  25.7  26  18.7  6  12.0 
Heavy industry  0  0.0  4  11.4  8  5.8  1  2.0 
Construction materials   0  0.0  3  8.6  17  12.2  3  6.0 
Services/other  0  0.0  5  14.3  33  23.7  20  40.0 
Total  40  100  35  100  139  100  50  100 
 
Current workforce size 
Firms with <10 workers  7  17.5  0  0  15  10.8  16  32.0 
  10-25 workers   21  52.5  0  0  46  33.1  24  48.0 
  26-100 workers  9  22.5  9  25.7  32  23.0  7  14.0 
  101-200 workers  3  7.5  14  40.0  14  10.1  0  0.0 
  >200 workers  0  0  12  34.3  32  23.0  3  6.0 
Total  40  100  35  100  139  100  50  100 
 
          Moscow          Rostov         Taganrog+   Vladivostok 
Sample Charatcteristics  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
 
Average number of locations per firm*  2.3  39  2.7  10  5.2  50  4.4  14 
 
Average number of employees  28  40  409  35  168  138  16  47 
 
Average monthly wage (rubles)  5214  40  2057  35  1458  139  4053  36 
 
Average tax (% of sales revenues)  41.8  40  37.2  34  37.4  137  38.2  33 
 
Percentage firms which own building(s)  5.0  40  48.6  35  69.8  136  28.0  50 
 
Percentage firms reporting profits  92.5  40  88.6  35  77.5  138  74.0  50 
Average percent profits reinvested  61.6  37  11.4  31  16.1  107  69.1  35 
 
Percentage of firms borrowing to 
  cover working capital expenses  77.5  40  8.6  35  21.0  138  22.0  50 
 
Percentage of firms borrowing 
  to cover wage bill  10.5  38  0  34  9.1  121  11.1  45 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Participating Firms (cont .) 
 
  Moscow  Rostov  Taganrog+  Vladivostok 
  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
 
Percentage of firms borrowing from bank   7.5  40  11.4  35  5.9  139  6.0  50 
 
Percentage of firms borrowing from 
       other firms  80.0  40  20.0  35  29.4  139  30.0  50 
 
Percentage of firms willing to pay for 
      Federal Property Protection Agency  97.5  40  93.9  33  95.8  123  74.3  39 
 
Percentage of Russian-made merchandise 
  stocked/sold by company   75.4  38  65.6  31  75.9  107  64.3  29 
 
Percentage of firms using barter trade  25.0  40  22.9  35  36.2  138  18.0  50 
Average percentage of barter transactions  7.8  9  12.1  7  19.7  44  10.1  9 
 
Percentage of firms paying bribes  97.5  40  68.6  35  74.6  138  48.0  50 
Average number of organizations to 
which bribe payments made  5-6  39  2-3  24  2-3  103  2-3  23 
Average number of times bribe 
  payments made per year  5-6  39  2-3  24  3-4  103  3-4  21 
 
Percentage of firms belonging to association 15.0  40  0.0  35  6.5  139  28.0  50 
 
Percentage of firms reporting volume of 
operations/sales in comparison to  
previous year:  higher  30.0  40  82.7  35  68.2  129  48.9  47 
  same  25.0    17.0    29.4    51.1   
  lower  45.0    0.0    2.4    0.0   
 
Percentage of firms reporting financial  
position in comparison to  
previous year:  better  27.8  36  65.7  35  50.4  136  38.8  49 
  same  47.2    34.3    48.1    61.2   
  worse  25.0    0.0    1.5    0.0   
 
Average percentage of mach/equip 
  needing replacement  32.5  35  26.1  31  38.9  121  28.9  47 
 
Average percentage of employees 
needing replacement  4.4  39  8.0  33  15.8  107  7.6  44 
 
Respondent characteristics 
  average age  43  40  40  35  42  137  40  49 
  gender (percent) 
  males  43.2    88.6    64.2    44.0   
  females   56.8    11.4    35.8    56.0   
 
 
 
 
+ Includes Azov. 
*Asked of retail shops and de novo firms only. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Table 2:  Property Protection and Credit Access 
 
 
  PROTECT1  PROTECT2  EXTORT  CREDIT 
Type of firm 
Retail (n=122)  .47  3.01  1.23  .93 
Manufacturing (n=79)  .37  3.02  1.34  .65 
Service (n=63)  .29  2.81  1.33  .67 
 
Main product/activity 
Food (n=95)  .54  3.14  1.33  1.02 
Consumer goods (n=31)  .35  2.98  1.16  .71 
Durables (n=42)  .21  3.00  1.38  .50 
Heavy industry (n=13)  .38  2.85  1.15  1.00 
Construction materials (n=23)  .43  3.04  1.30  .70 
Services/other (n=57)  .32  2.63  1.21  .58 
 
Location 
Moscow (n=40)  .30  2.68  1.17  1.75 
Rostov (n=35)  .26  3.51  1.60  .40 
Taganrog (n=139)  .36  3.29  1.52  .65 
Vladivostok (n=50)  .68  1.88  .48  .68 
 
Ownership of buildings 
Lease (n=133)  .38  2.73  1.13  .89 
Own (n=161)  .36  2.98  1.28  .63 
 
 
Protect1:  Maximum value = 3. 
Protect2:  Maximum value = 5. 
Extort:  Maximum value = 2. 
 
Credit:  Maximum value = 4. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Table 3:  Regression Results 
 
 
Dependent variable = REINVEST 
 
      (1)             (2)           (3)         (4)      (5)      (6) 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
 
PROTECT1  .080  2.60*      .064  2.08** 
PROTECT2  -.077  -5.43*      -.084  -5.88* 
EXTORT      -.174  -7.20*      -.183  -7.80*  -.189  -8.21*  -.111  -4.60* 
CREDIT  .046  2.21**  .060  3.06*  .038  1.92**  .051  2.68*  .051  2.75*  .043  2.52* 
 
MOSCOW  .268  5.07*  .243  4.82*  .239  4.17*  .221  4.16*  .175  3.27*  -.020  -.34 
 
FOOD          .187  2.47*  .196  2.71*  .171  2.41**  .169  2.63* 
CGOODS          -.009  -.10  -.012     -.14  -.058  -.69  -.021  -.29 
DURABLES          .072  .91  .087  1.13  .078  1.04  .067  .98 
CONSTMAT          .110  1.29  .111  1.35  .103  1.29  .106  1.46 
SERVOTH          .208  2.69*  .221  2.98*  .174  2.35**  .131  1.95** 
 
MFG                  -.121  -3.32*  -.123  -3.60* 
 
LNAVGWG                      .229  5.97* 
 
LEASE                      -.005  -.15 
 
Constant  .446  8.88*  .467  12.26*  .344  4.14*  .343  4.68*  .421  5.59*  -1.401  -4.62* 
 
Adj R-squared     .3415    .3771    .3877    .4313    .4583    .5409 
 
Observations    n = 210      n = 210    n = 210   n = 210    n= 210      n = 201 
 
 
*Significant @ 1% 
**Significant @ 5% William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Table 3:  Regression Results (cont’d) 
 
 
Dependent variable = REINVEST 
      (7)              (8)           (9)         (10)      (11)              (12) 
Variable  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
 
PROTECT1   .077  2.58*  .083  2.73*  .081  2.65*       
PROTECT2   -.066  -4.41*  -.060  -4.02*  -.976  -5.30* 
EXTORT              -.171  -7.05*  -.185  -8.07*  -.107  -4.52* 
CREDIT  .039  1.94**  .045  2.16** 
LOAN          .080  2.05**  .106  2.83*  .101  2.79*  .090  2.82* 
 
MOSCOW  .213  3.73*  .251  4.12*  .287  5.80*  .269  5.64*  .193  3.79* 
  
FOOD                  .175  2.47*  .171  2.73* 
CGOODS                   -.051  -.61  -.015  -.20 
DURABLES                  .083  1.10  .070  1.04 
CONSTMAT                  .109  1.35  .110  1.53 
SERVOTH                  .185  2.50*  .143  2.15** 
 
MFG  -.073  -1.61              -.123  -3.36*  -.121  -3.78* 
 
LNAVGWG                      .223  7.64* 
 
LEASE  -.035  -.92 
 
VOLUME      -.006  -.16 
POSITION      -.013  -.33                 
 
WKSIZE1  .169  2.78*  .143  2.28* 
WKSIZE2  .045  1.02  .042  .94 
WKSIZE4  .024  .38  -.004  -.56 
WKSIZE5  -.327  -.57  -.083  -1.54 
 
Constant  .469  5.85*  .411  5.12*  .439  8.60*  .460  11.80*  .406  5.33*  -1.38  -5.73* 
     
Adj R-squared  .3908    .3622    .3392    .3625    .4587    .5488 
    
Observations    207    195    210    210    210    201 
 
 
* Significant @ 1% 
** Significant @ 5% William Davidson Institute Working Paper 469 
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Appendix A 
Variable List:   Definition, Mean value 
Variable name    Definition               Mean      Obs 
REINVEST    % profit reinvested in the firm           .322    210 
 
MILITSIA    police work well/effectively to protect property          .054    264 
SATISFY    satisfied with efforts of police when called       .220    264 
COURTWEL    courts work well/effectively to protect property       .132    264 
 
PROTECT1    index of police and court effectiveness (max value = 3)     .398    264 
 
ASKPOLC    did firm ask police for assistance        .254    264 
SECURITY    does firm employ security personnel         .716    264 
BUYSEC    does firm employ other organization to provide security     .708    264 
BRIBE      did company make bribe payments last year       .720    264 
BRIBECRT    would bribe payment avoid court appearance       .568    264 
 
PROTECT2    index of protection payments (max value = 5)     2.966    264 
 
EXTORT    index of bribe payments (max value = 2)     1.288    264 
 
RENOVATE    plans for major repairs             .207    261 
VOLUME    volume of sales/operations this year compared to last         1.481    251 
POSITION    financial position this year compared to last     1.587    256 
BORROW    borrow for working capital          .280    264 
BOROWW    borrow to pay wages             .076    264 
BANKLOAN    borrow from bank             .068    264 
LOANPVT    borrow from private individual or company       .356    264 
 
CREDIT    index of access to external financing (max value = 4)     .780    264 
LOAN      dummy variable = 1 if any external financing       .409    264 
 
MOSCOW    dummy variable = 1 if firm located in Moscow       .152    264 
ROSTOV    dummy variable =1 if firm located in Rostov       .132    264 
TAGANROG    dummy variable = 1 if firm located in Taganrog, Azov     .525    264 
VLADSTOK    dummy variable = 1 if firm located in Vladivostok    .189    264 
 
RETAIL    dummy variable = 1 if firm is retail shop       .462    264 
MFG      dummy variable =1 if firm is manufacturing      .299    264 
SERVICE    dummy variable = 1 if firm is non-retail, non-mfg    .238    264 
 
FOOD      dummy variable = 1 if food production/distribution     .360    264 
CGOODS    dummy variable = 1 if consumer goods production/dist     .117    264 
DURABLES    dummy variable = 1 if consumer durables     .159    264 
HEAVY   dummy variable = 1 if heavy industry / mch bldg     .049    264 
CONSTMAT    dummy variable = 1 if construction materials       .087    264 
SERVOTH    dummy variable = 1 if service, other         .216    264 
 
LEASE    dummy variable = 1 if firm leases premises      .504    264 
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Variable name    Definition               Mean      Obs 
 
AVGWAGE    average wage                      2516.6    250 
LNAVGWG    ln average wage          7.626    250 
 
WKSIZE1    dummy variable = 1 if workforce size < 10       .144    264 
WKSIZE2    dummy variable =1 if workforce size 10-25       .345    264 
WKSIZE3    dummy variable =1 if workforce size 26-50       .216    264 
WKSIZE4    dummy variable =1 if workforce size 51-200       .117    264 
WKSIZE5    dummy variable = 1 if workforce size > 200       .178    264 
 
VOLUME    sales volume this year in comparison to last year   1.482    251 
      1=higher, 2 = same, 3 = lower 
 
POSITION    financial position this year in comparison to last year   1.578    256 
      1 = better, 2 = same, 3 = worse,  
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